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I.  Introduction 
The East Asian countries were hit hard by the financial crisis of 1997 but experienced a 
significant and remarkable recovery due in part to far-reaching economic and regulatory reforms.  
However, a decade later, the Asian countries are suffering again from the ongoing global economic 
crisis which began in the summer of 2007.  If this current crisis is not managed effectively, the 
Asian economic situation could escalate into a more serious crisis than that of 1997-98.  Due to the 
increased globalization of financial markets, crises tend to become more severe and contagious 
even if the affected countries have strong macroeconomic fundamentals.  The two crises, ten years 
apart, provide us with a unique case study to examine whether or not the recovery from the 1997 
crisis and the extensive reform efforts during the post-crisis period in Asia have been well executed, 
or whether they have been incomplete and ineffective in addressing the on-going global economic 
and financial crises since 2007. 
Focusing on the Korean economy, which experienced the worst damage as well as the most 
successful recovery from the 1997 crisis, this paper discusses the successes and failures of the post-
crisis reform efforts and identifies vulnerable areas that need further reform in Korea.  There is no 
precise answer for why and how one of the most successful developing economies over the past 40 
years suddenly became a victim of the Asian financial/economic crisis.  Although policy makers 
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and academics still discuss the true causes and nature of the 1997 Asian crisis, the case of Korea, in 
particular, has certainly highlighted the potential dangers from the volatility of certain types of 
financial flows, the importance of an efficient financial system and effective corporate governance, 
and the additional dangers of moral hazard and global contagion.2  Korea has experienced one of 
the fastest recoveries among the crisis-hit Asian countries by conducting efficient crisis 
management policies, financial market restructuring, and institutional reforms.3
This paper also discusses some of the specific lessons that can be learned from Korea’s 
experience during the 1997 Asian financial crisis in order to help prevent from the reoccurrence of 
similar financial crises and economic downturns in the future.  They are:  1) monitoring 
international capital flows and conducting better international debt management; 2) maintaining a 
competitive, efficient and well-regulated financial system to be protected from international 
contagia; 3) establishing an effective nonperforming asset management mechanism, such as the 
Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO); and 4) enhancing regional financial cooperation 
among the East Asian countries, such as a renewed Chiang Mai Initiative to provide a short-term 
liquidity support, defend Asian currencies from speculative attack, and assist long-term economic 
growth in the East Asian region.   
  (See Figure 1) 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the unique nature of the 1997 
crisis in Korea.  Section III identifies the mistakes of Korean policy makers and businesses and 
provides a basis for deriving lessons from the Korean experience.  Section IV introduces the 
successful and efficient reform measures and crisis management strategies while providing a useful 
bench-marking case for non-Korean policy makers.  Section V identifies areas of vulnerability in 
Korea to address during the on-going 2008-9 global economic crisis.  Section VI discusses regional 
economic integration and new Chiang Mai initiatives for the post-crisis period in East Asia as 
                                                 
2 For general references for causes, contagion, theories and policy responses on the Asian financial crisis, see 
Pierre-Richard Agenor et al., eds., THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONTAGION AND 
CONSEQUENCES, Cambridge Univ. Press (1999).   
3 See Figure 1, infra. 
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important institutional reforms to prevent future financial crises in the region.  Section VII lists the 
policy lessons and concludes the paper. 
 
II.  The Korean Crisis:  Unique and Different 
On December 4, 1997, the Korean government reached a $58.4 billion standby agreement 
with the IMF.4  In return, the emergency rescue plan required Korea to launch a range of structural 
reforms in the financial sector, corporate sector, and labor market along with sound management of 
macroeconomic policy to regain global market confidence.  Until then, the Korean economy had 
recorded a remarkable performance during its relatively short modern economic history, and 
became an exemplary case of economic development by applying the export-led economic 
development strategy.  Korea's currency crisis in late 1997, however, quickly escalated into 
financial and economic crises, with the continued loss of confidence by foreign investors.  With the 
exodus of foreign capital, the value of the Korean currency, the Korean won, fell by more than 50 
percent and real gross domestic product (GDP) contracted about 6 percent during 1998.5  The 
downturn was led by a sharp contraction in corporate investment and consumer spending.  A surge 
in corporate bankruptcies increased the unemployment rate to over 8 percent by the end of 1998 
from less than 3 percent in 1997.6
                                                 
4 For a summary of the agreement, see Republic of Korea IMF Stand-by Arrangement December 5, 1997, 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/oth/korea.htm.  The $58.4 billion 
standby loan package, about 13 percent of Korea’s GDP in 1997, was contributed by the IMF ($21.2 billion), 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank ($14.2 billion), and the donor governments of the U.S., Japan and 
Europe ($23.1 billion).  See Jahyeong Koo and Sherry L. Kaiser, Recovery from a Financial Crisis: The Case 
of Korea, ECON. & FIN. REV., 4th Q. 2001, at 24, 26. (detailing the loans made to Korea) 
  Although this development seems to be one of the typical stories 
of the so-called 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Korean crisis is considered to have several unique 
aspects that differentiate Korea from other crisis-hit Asian countries — in the causes of the crisis, 
crisis management policies and strategies, and recovery processes. 
5 Koo and Kaiser, supra note 4, at 27. 
6 Id. at 30-31. 
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First, the Korean crisis, in contrast to other crisis-hit countries in Asia, is believed to be 
more of a liquidity crisis rather than a structural crisis.7  A relatively quick and impressive recovery 
process in Korea (the so-called V-shape recovery), strong fundamental macroeconomic indicators 
prior to the crisis, and early repayment of borrowing from the IMF rescue package provide 
supporting evidence for this view.  This liquidity crisis argument does not mean that Korea did not 
have structural weaknesses that needed to be corrected during the crisis.  However, the 
fundamental nature of the Korean crisis seems to have often been misrepresented or exaggerated, 
for example, by those who allege that the crisis was caused by “crony capitalism” or the complete 
failure of “the Asian model or Korean model” of economic development.8
Second, the role of the government has been unique in Korea.  During most of its four 
decades of economic development, the government controlled the allocation and prioritization of 
  The Korean crisis was 
partly caused by internal problems, which will be discussed in Section III, although contagia from 
the troubled Southeast Asian economies aggravated the Korean situation with unfortunate ill-
timing. 
                                                 
7 There have been two conflicting views for the root causes of the 1997 Asian crisis — the structural crisis 
and the liquidity crisis.  The former view states that the crisis was caused by weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals and/or structural flaws in the socio-economic system; whereas the latter view believes that the 
Asian crisis was caused mainly by the mismanagement of borrowed funds from abroad, foreign debt and 
international reserve assets.  For the recovery, a structural crisis would require major structural and 
institutional reforms which suggest a long-term recovery process, while a liquidity crisis would only need the 
rescheduling of debt, international cooperation of lenders in debt restructuring, and the correction of currency 
and maturity mismatches between foreign financing and domestic lending, along with short-term liquidity 
injection.  The former view is in line with the so-called first-generation model of economic crisis a la 
Krugman.  See Paul Krugman, A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises, 11 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT, AND 
BANKING 311 (1979). This view has been supported by the IMF’s economists. See, e.g., Michael Dooley, A 
Model of Crises in Emerging Markets, International Finance Discussion Paper, No. 630, Bd. of Gov. of the 
Fed. Res. System (1998).  The latter view is consistent with the second-generation model of the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of crisis. See, e.g., Steven Radelet and Jeremy Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, No. 6680, 1998), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6680.pdf.   Radelet and Sachs examined the weak-fundamental view and the 
financial-panic view as causes of the Asian crisis, and arrived at mixed conclusions. 
8 One example of the reports asserting ‘crony capitalism’ and serious limitations of the ‘Asian model’ as the 
main cause of the Asian crises is The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998: Adopting U.S.  Intelligence and 
Policy-Making to the Challenges of Global Economics (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown 
Univ., Working Group Rep. No. V, 2006).  
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resources and credit.9
Third, Korea has a culture of uniqueness and a long history of more than 4,300 years.  A 
deep understanding of culture is essential for an accurate appreciation of economic and social 
changes, including crisis and reform.  Some examples of unique culture-rooted institutional factors 
in Korea include chaebols (family-owned conglomerates), curb corporate bond markets (informal 
and high interest private loans), unique management-employee relationships and labor unions, 
compensation systems, the chaebol firms’ and suppliers’ relationship with the promissory note 
market, localism, and the importance of blood and alumni relationships.  Examples of unique 
Korean features in its crisis management tools emerged during the post-crisis period – including a 
gold-collection campaign, self-imposed salary reductions by employees, and the tripartite 
agreement for burden-sharing among management, labor and government.
  The government also determined restructuring initiatives and took full 
control of reform agenda to correct its own mistakes and oversights during the post-crisis period.  
From the neoclassical viewpoint, the role of the government in Korea would be considered to be 
unfair and controversial.  In reality, the interventionist role of the government is considered to be 
one of the significant contributing factors for the so-called Asian miracle as well as the remarkable 
recovery from the 1997 crisis. 
10
Fourth, IMF conditionality imposed an array of reforms in the financial sector, corporate 
sector, labor market, and macroeconomic policy implementations.
 
11
                                                 
9 See generally THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Masahiko Aoki et al., eds., 2d ed. 2005) (1996)(comparing the history of 
government intervention in economic growth and development in the East Asian nations).   
  The IMF’s ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
10 In February 1998, the Korean government, businesses and workers reached the Tripartite Agreement to 
facilitate the labor market adjustment in Korea. See History of the Econ. and Soc. Dev. Comm’n. of Korea, 
http://www.lmg.go.kr/eng/about/about04.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).  A historically unprecedented 
organization, the Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC, since renamed the Economic and Social Development 
Commission), issued “The Tripartite Joint Statement on Fair Burden Sharing in the Process of Overcoming 
Economic Crisis,” and agreed that the labor union accepts the employer’s right to make redundancy layoffs, 
and, in return, employers accepted the worker’s right to union representation, unemployment insurance and 
an extended social safety net.  See Keun Lee & Chung H. Lee, The Miracle to Crisis and the Mirage of the 
Postcrisis Reform in Korea: Assessment After Ten Years, 19 J. OF ASIAN ECON. 425, 429 (2008).  The KTC 
has provided a forum for frank consultation, dialogue, and compromise among labor, management and 
government as an important reform effort during the post-crisis period in Korea.   
11 See International Monetary Fund, supra note 4. 
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prescription for bailing out Korea has received criticisms and complaints from both within and 
outside Korea.  For example, some critics claim that the dictated banking reform plan was too 
harsh and the tight monetary policy, which had the intention of attracting foreign capital, resulted 
in a painful recovery process only after afflicting severe and unjustifiable damage to the most 
vulnerable classes of society  —  such as low-income households, small-and-medium size firms, 
and near-retirement age workers.12  The case of the Korean crisis and subsequent reforms is 
considered to provide more convincing evidence, than other crisis-hit Asian countries, of the ill-
prepared, mechanical and culturally insensitive nature of the IMF rescue plan.13
 
 
III.  Korea’s Mistakes — Its Own Lessons 
A decade later, some consensus has been reached on Korea’s mistakes and oversights 
before the 1997 crisis was erupted.  As Table 1 depicts, the Korean economy had strong 
fundamentals as evidenced by relatively good-standing macroeconomic indicators prior to the crisis.  
During the early and mid-1990s, Korea performed well with 5-9 percent real GDP growth rates, 
35-40 percent high saving and investment rates, 4-6 percent of inflation rate, 2 percent 
unemployment, and prudent fiscal policy with a balanced government budget.   
However, weakness and vulnerability had been developing during the early period of 
economic development until the crisis broke out in several areas — the financial sector, the 
corporate sector, Chaebol-government risk relations, and capital account and international debt 
management.  The danger of the microeconomic mismanagement in these vulnerable sectors and 
                                                 
12 Mishkin argues that an international lender of last resort such as the IMF is needed to cope with financial 
crises in emerging economies where external debt is denominated in foreign currencies and to address 
institutional inadequacies in dealing with expansionary monetary policy after the crisis.  See Frederic S. 
Mishkin, Lessons from the Asian Crisis, 18 J. OF INT’L MONEY AND FINANCE 709, 714 (1999).  However, the 
international lender of last resort will produce better outcome only when it acts quickly, free of moral hazard, 
and as a fair third party to provide the necessary momentum for microeconomic reform and change.  Id. 
13 A series of strong critics on the IMF conditionality imposed on the Asian countries during the 1997-8 crisis 
have been presented in:  JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); JAGDISH 
BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2007); and Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt 
Overhang: Some Analytical Notes, 29 J. OF DEV. ECON. 253 (1988), among others. 
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institutional loopholes became more evident during the pre-crisis period in Korea, and these areas 
turned out to present serious burdens on the sustainability of the Korean economy.  The contagion 
effect, initially unexpected, from the collapse of currency/financial markets in Thailand in July 
1997 and its neighboring countries immediately afterwards aggravated the Korean problems with 
unfortunate ill-timing.  Each of Korea’s main mistakes will be overviewed briefly.   
 
A.  Foreign Borrowing with Currency and Maturity Mismatch and International Debt   
Mismanagement 
 
One of the major challenges for developing countries such as in the Korean economy, with 
inadequate domestic saving in spite of their relatively high savings rates, is how to optimally and 
efficiently finance the nation's economic development with foreign capital and saving.14
On the other hand, capital inflows, which are desperately needed to finance economic 
development, may generate various negative effects on the economy.  Part of the capital will go to 
consumption, instead of investment, increase aggregate demand, and create inflationary pressure.  
Capital inflows appreciate real exchange rates and, consequently, generate a deficit in the current 
account.  Such current account deficits and large foreign borrowing significantly increase the 
vulnerability of the economy to variations in international capital flows.  When further foreign 
borrowing is induced to finance the deficits and is composed of short-term and volatile sources, the 
vulnerability becomes even greater.  Foreign investors may overreact to any unfavorable, domestic 
and international developments and withdraw their funds quickly.  Thus capital inflows, which 
have been vital for economic growth, could become the country's weakness.  The vulnerability will 
  Although 
foreign capital has played a very important role in accelerating economic growth in less developed 
countries, there are inherent risks on relying on too much and/or inadequate sources of foreign 
capital, which can result in an unsustainable build-up of foreign debt (a so-called debt crisis) or 
various forms of financial/currency crises. 
                                                 
14 See Figure 2, infra. 
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be compounded if the domestic banking system is weak and is not able to withstand a reversal of 
capital flows.  Unfortunately, this was the case in Korea. 
Excluding the current financial crisis, Korea's macroeconomic performance until the third 
quarter of 1997 was broadly positive.  There were, however, unfavorable developments in other 
areas immediately before Korea was hit hard in October and November 1997, most conspicuously 
the bankruptcies of chaebols and the increasing trade deficits.  Subdued import demand and the 
plummeting prices of DRAMs15
In the 1990s, a number of highly leveraged conglomerates (called chaebols) went 
bankrupt.
 caused the widened current account deficits since 1994, especially 
in 1996 and 1997.  The current account deficit in 1996 reached $23.3 billion or almost 6 percent of 
GDP, as shown in Table 1.  The deficits were financed mostly by foreign borrowing of banks and 
financial institutions along with portfolio investment by foreign investors to Korea. 
16
                                                 
15 DRAM, or Dynamic Random Access Memory, is computer memory chip (a semiconductor product) which 
is vital to the Korean economy. 
  This was caused by excessive investment — such as steel and automobiles — labor 
strikes, and weakened profitability of exporting firms due to worsened terms of trade and the 
appreciated Korean won.  The bankruptcies severely weakened the financial system and resulted in 
the accumulation of non-performing loans.  The exodus of foreign capital invested in Korean 
stocks and securities and the successive downgrade of Korea's sovereign rating by international 
credit rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, exacerbated the confusing crisis 
situation.  Abrupt and massive outflows of foreign capital from Korea made it problematic to 
maintain an optimal level of international reserves and sharply tightened the availability of external 
finance in the international financial market, which was already contaminated by Asian flu started 
in Thailand in July 1997.  Although strong fundamentals and the relatively sound public sector 
make the Korean case different from the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1990s and the 
16 A series of chaebol bankruptcies started from the collapse of Hanbo Iron and Steel (1990), followed by Kia 
Motor, Jinro, Sammi, Haitai and Halla (1996 and 1997).  See generally Chung H. Lee et al., Chaebols, 
Financial Liberalization and Economic Crisis: Transformation of Quasi-Internal Organization of Korea, 16 
ASIAN ECON. J. 17 (2002). 
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Mexican crisis in December 1994, unmonitored over-borrowing and mismanagement of 
international liquidity brought Korea to the crisis outbreak. 
As Figure 2 depicts, the accumulated current account deficits and over-investment during 
the pre-crisis period in Korea had to be compensated by foreign saving.  Portfolio investment and 
borrowing foreign funds with short-term maturities by the financial institutions brought in foreign 
capital quickly, but this capital was riskier due to currency and maturity mismatch and the high 
probability of its reversal in direction during a future crisis.  At the end of 1997, Korea’s total 
external debt had accumulated to $174 billion which is 33.7 percent of Korea’s GDP.  Among them, 
total short-term external debt amounted to more than $100 billion, or 58 percent of the total, while 
usable international reserve held by the Bank of Korea were only $9.1 billion.17
 
  Accordingly, by 
then it was not feasible for Korea to handle the “double mismatch” problems on its own.  The 
majority (70-80 percent) of bank borrowing from abroad was conducted with short-term maturities 
of one year or shorter.  The mismatch problems stemmed significantly from the inefficient 
surveillance and supervision of financial institutions in Korea, especially merchant banks.  
B.  The Controversial Government-Business Risk Partnership:  Moral Hazard and Implicit 
Guarantees 
 
 One of the most distinctive characteristics of the “Korean model” of economic 
development during the last four decades is the government-business partnership.18
                                                 
17 See Figure 1, infra.  The official volume of international reserve assets held by the Bank of Korea right 
before the Korean crisis in November 1997 was more than $32 billion.  However, the majority of the reserve 
assets was not readily available since they were lent out to overseas branches of the Korean commercial 
banks as their operating capital.   
  Since the early 
1960s when an export-oriented economic development strategy was adopted, the Korean 
government has provided preferential loans through government controlled banks, tax (and tariff) 
favors, and repayment guarantees (explicit and implicit) to foreign lenders.  Although the 
government-business partnership worked remarkably well during the early stage of economic 
development with an efficient allocation of limited resources and credit, the partnership started to 
18 See Aoki et al., supra note 9. 
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show flaws, especially the government partnership with Korea’s family-owned business groups, or 
chaebols.  The 30 chaebols had significant shares of ownership in commercial banks and non-bank 
financial institutions (NBFIs), and exercised their influence in the financial sector.  Corporate 
financing in Korea became heavily dependent on banks and NBFIs.  As a result, alternative sources 
of financing, such as direct financing through the issue of corporate bonds and commercial papers, 
had not become significant sources until the early 1990s.  Most of the chaebols used NBFIs heavily, 
especially merchant banks, to borrow funds from abroad.  This is because merchant banks were not 
regulated properly, unlike commercial banks, in their dealings with short-term, high risk foreign 
borrowing. 
 Chaebols were the major benefactors of Korea’s government-controlled credit allocation, 
financial liberalization policy, and various export-promotion measures.  Several bail-out measures 
of near-bankrupt chaebols in earlier years created a false belief that the government would 
implicitly guarantee against their bankruptcy in any event.19  At the same time, foreign lenders 
believed there was relatively little default risk for chaebol loans since the government would pick 
up near-default loans.  It created a “too-big-to-fail” dilemma for chaebols in Korea.20  This 
nonmarket-based and high cost government-chaebol relationship became one of the main 
contributing factors to the problems of over-investment, low profitability, and increasing non-
performing loans (NPLs), which culminated on the eve of the Korean crisis in November 1997.21
  
  
                                                 
19 See Sung Wook Joh, The Korean Corporate Sector: Crisis and Reform, in KOREA’S ECONOMIC 
PROSPECTS: FROM FINANCIAL CRISIS TO PROSPERITY 116, 118-19 (O. Yul Kwon & William Shepherd, eds., 
2001) (chronicling the history of government involvement in the financial affairs of the Chaebols).  
20 As of April 2001, when a series of chaebol reforms had been executed, top 10 business groups in Korea 
were Korea Electric Power Corp.  (KEPCO, total asset:  92.1 tril won), Samsung (83.5), LG (58.6), SK (47.5), 
Hyundai Motors (44.1), KT (30.6), Korea Highway Corp.  (KHC, 28.3), Hanjin (21.0), Lotte (20.7), and 
POSCO (20.5).  Among them, Samsung, LG, SK, Hyundai Motors, Hanjin, and Lotte are chaebols, whereas 
KEPCO and KHC are the state-owned groups, and KT and POSCO are the private groups but not controlled 
by the owner family.  See KOREA TRADE COMM’N., BUSINESS GROUPS UNDER REGULATIONS IN 2001 (2001) 
(in Korean). 
21 The Korean chaebols were involved with highly leveraged business operations and over-investment in 
overlapping and less promising projects.  The average debt-equity ratio for the top 30 chaebols exceeded 500 
percent in 1997 and reached 524 percent, which is more than double the OECD average.  For the corporate 
governance reform and its outcome, see Lee & Lee, supra note 10. 
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C.  The Sequence and Timing of Financial Liberalization:  Ill-Prepared and Hurried22
 
 
Until the early 1990s, foreign capital contributed to the continued rapid growth of the 
Korean economy, which was also aided by the favorable macroeconomic environment and current 
account surpluses.  The Korean government restricted new foreign borrowing, especially in public 
loans and commercial loans, but encouraged the issue of new foreign bonds as a means to attract 
foreign capital.  During the period from 1986 to 1992, a total of $30.4 billion of foreign capital 
arrived in Korea, which was slightly less amount than the total for the previous six-year period in 
the 1980s.23  By type, foreign bonds issued by financial institutions and private firms increased 
sharply, while foreign borrowing through bank loans was significantly reduced.  Thanks to the 
improved investment environment in Korea, FDI increased fivefold over the previous period to 
$5.6 billion.24
Consequently, the sources of foreign borrowing became well-balanced with 15 percent of 
public loans, 17 percent of commercial loans, 14 percent of bank loans, 20 percent of foreign bonds 
issued by financial institutions, 15 percent of equity related foreign bonds issued by private firms, 
and 19 percent of FDI out of the total foreign borrowing.
 
25  The structural improvements in foreign 
borrowing had been achieved:  the significant reduction in the debt-service-ratio (DSR) from 30 
percent in 1987 to 5 percent in 1992, the accelerated early repayments of foreign loans, and the 
diversification of foreign borrowing types as described above.26
                                                 
22 This section expands on an earlier work of mine examining the history and nature of foreign capital 
inflows into Korea.  See Bang Nam Jeon, The Role of Foreign Capital in the Korean Economy: A Driving 
Force of Economic Development or Financial Crisis? in SERIES IN HONOR OF RAL PREBISCH AND SIR HANS 
SINGER, VOL.  XXIII: NICS AFTER ASIAN CRISIS (Sir Hans Singer, Neelambar Hatti and Rameshwar Tandon, 
eds., 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305682. 
  However, these balanced and self-
disciplined capital inducement policies in Korea started to be reversed after this period. 
23Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 For the history of foreign capital flows into Korea, government policies for inducing foreign capital, and 
the role of foreign capital for economic development in Korea, see Bang Nam  Jeon, The Role of Foreign 
Capital in the Korean Economy: A Driving Force of Economic Development or Financial Crisis? in Sir Hans 
Singer, Neelambar Hatti and Rameshwar Tandon, eds., XXIII SERIES IN HONOR OF RAL PREBISCH AND SIR 
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Since 1993, the Korean financial and capital markets became more internationalized and 
open to foreign investors.  For example, the Korean government relaxed the restrictions on 
investing in the Korean stock market by foreign investors, in order to establish a 10 percent foreign 
investment ceiling per issue and a 3 percent limitation on individual holdings per issue.27  In 
accordance with the OECD requirements placed on Korea as a member nation since 1994, the 
stock market was opened further in 1996, raising the foreign investment ceiling to 18 percent per 
issue and the individual ceiling to 4 percent.28  Aided by these financial market liberalization 
measures, the amount of capital inflow into Korea had greatly increased in the years, leading up to 
the crisis.  During the pre-crisis period, as shown in Table 1, foreign capital inflow was primarily in 
the form of portfolio investment and short-term bank loan rather than foreign direct investment, 
which is more long-term and committed.29
In 1998, the ceiling on foreign investments in the stock market was lifted altogether.  The 
Korean market had become more favorable to foreign investment due to sweeping reforms since 
the IMF stepped in to bail out Korea from its currency crisis in November 1997.  Attracting foreign 
investment became a policy priority, especially in the form of FDI, mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A), and technology transfer.   
  
The Korean people have, however, learned a hard lesson that as the process of financial the 
deregulation and liberalization has led to a more integrated and globalized Korean capital market, 
Korea also became more exposed to the volatile nature of profit-seeking capital flows and currency 
risks.  The roots of the capital account problems actually started to build up from the beginning of 
the 1990s in the area of foreign capital inflows.  This is shown in Panel II (“External Sector”) of 
                                                                                                                                                    
HANS SINGER: NICS AFTER ASIAN CRISIS (2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305682. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Kaminsky and Reinhart find that financial liberalization and lending increases, rather than simple capital 
inflows, are important predictors of banking crises. See Garciela L.  Kaminsky & Carmen M.  Reinhart, The 
Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems, 1999 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 473. 
474.  They also find that when currency and naming crises occur jointly, the crises are far more severe than 
when they occur in isolation. Id. 
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Table 1.  FDI inflows and bond financing, which are relatively stable sources of foreign capital, 
have increased steadily.  Portfolio investment and borrowing by the financial institutions, which 
brought in foreign capital quickly but were riskier due to the high probability of its reversal in 
direction, have also increased significantly since the beginning of the 1990s.  The liberalization of 
capital accounts after the early 1990s proceeded swiftly and aggressively with the need to pay for 
increasing current account deficits without adequately preparing the domestic financial sector and 
the current account liberalization.  The sequence of opening domestic markets to foreign investors 
was reversed and the speed of liberalization was too fast.  Although Korea had actually realized the 
vulnerability that had built up in the area of foreign capital inflows and the inefficient financial 
sector, and planned to overhaul the outmoded financial system in the beginning of 1997, it turned 
out to be too late.30
 
 
D.  The Contagion Channel:  Unexpected and Ignored 
 
A remarkable feature of the Asian crisis was the speed with which it spread from Thailand 
to other countries in the region, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea in the 
span of a few months.  The Asian crisis started when the Thai exchange market collapsed on July 2, 
1997.  The currency crisis spread to the neighboring Southeast Asian countries.  In late October, 
the contagion spread to the Hong Kong currency and stock markets.  Policy makers and investors 
in Korea did not expect that the so-called “Asian virus” would spread to Korea. 
There have been different explanations and proposals for why and how contagion spread so 
quickly in the region, namely macroeconomic similarities, trade links across countries, and cross-
country financial links.  Careful examination of macroeconomic indicators around the outbreak of 
the currency crises in the crisis-stricken nations reveals the relative irrelevance of the strength of 
                                                 
30 In January 1997, the Presidential Commission for Financial Reform was launched and it submitted a 
number of policy recommendations including improved regulation of the financial sector in Korea. See Joon-
Ho Hahm, Financial System Restructuring in Korea: The Crisis and its Resolution, in EAST ASIA’S 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: EVOLUTION & CRISIS 109, 109 (Seiichi Masuyama et al., eds., 1999). 
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macroeconomic fundamentals with the eruption and contagion of the 1997 Asian crisis.31
The major indicators of financial crises and contagion include volatile movements in the 
exchange rate, the depletion of international reserves, sharply rising short-term interest rates and 
falling stock market prices.  During the major financial crises of the 1990s, these financial variables 
moved significantly in many of the affected countries.  These indicators, therefore, may identify 
other countries affected by contagion.  Stock markets in the region, in particular, were found to 
play an important role in transmitting initial and local shocks beyond their country of origin to 
other emerging economies during the 1997 crisis.
  The 
swift and global-scale contagion of the Asian crises seems to support financial links, rather than 
trade links, as the key channel of contagion.  The occurrence of a crisis in one country may induce 
global investors to rebalance their portfolios for various reasons.  In the world of financially linked 
nations, shifts in investor sentiment or increased risk aversion can play an important role in the 
spread of crises. 
32
The first channel of spreading crises via stock market contagion is the erosion of investor 
confidence by investors.  A decline in confidence caused by a currency crisis in the crisis-origin 
country results in falling stock prices with greater volatility.  Stock market linkages provide an 
effective path for the spread of eroded confidence across countries.  Stock market linkages also 
work as an indirect channel of contagion through the role of foreign investors.  Liquidity 
difficulties facing international investors as a result of currency crises also force the investors to 
liquidate their positions in other national markets, consequently spreading the crises.
  
33
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Robert Chang and Andres Velasco, The Asian Liquidity Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 6796, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226387. 
  
32 Using high-frequency data of foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and stock market indices of the hardest 
hit countries in the region — Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea, in separate studies Jeon and Chiang 
provide evidence of financial linkages across countries as a channel of contagion for currency crises in the 
case of the 1997 Asian crisis.  See Bang Nam Jeon, Financial Links and Contagion in the 1997 Asian 
Currency Crisis: An Empirical Examination, 86 CONTEMPORARY STUD. IN ECON. AND FIN. ANALYSIS 101 
(2005); see also Thomas C. Chiang, Bang Nam Jeon & Huimin Li, Dynamic Correlation Analysis of 
Financial Contagion: Evidence from Asian Countries, 26 J.  OF INT’L MONEY AND FIN. 1206 (2007). 
33 For empirical evidence of the unique role of international credit rating agencies in affecting domestic and 
cross-country stock markets, along with the contagion effects, during the 1997 Asian crisis period, see 
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The common lender problems of the Japanese investors in Southeast Asia, portfolio 
rebalancing across countries by international fund managers, and American and Japanese banks’ 
refusal to roll over their loans to Korean financial institutions are all additional factors which 
contributed to the financial contagion from Southeast Asia to Korea.  The Korean economy and 
policy makers did not have the proper tools and preparation to minimize the contagion channels of 
cross-country financial linkages. 
 
IV.  Efficient and Successful Crisis Management and Reform – a Bench-Marking Case 
 
The process of post-crisis reform and recovery in Korea was successful and swift.  One of 
the most important contributing factors for Korea’s successful and quick recovery from the 1997-
98 crisis was the establishment of effective crisis resolution mechanisms.  The resolution of weak 
banks and financial institution requires: (1) diagnostic reviews of bank portfolios; (2) the 
identification of viable and nonviable banks; (3) the resolution of nonviable banks; (4) the quick 
clean-up of toxic/bad assets and nonperforming loans (NPLs) from troubled financial institutions; 
and (5) the recapitalization of viable banks and the protection of depositors in order to regain 
confidence in the banking system.  For the first three tasks, the Financial Supervisory Commission 
(FSC) was established as an independent, consolidated supervisory authority for banks, securities 
houses and insurance companies;34 for the later two tasks (4) and (5), two state-owned 
corporations — the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO)35 and the Korea Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (KDIC)36
 
 —were established, immediately after the 1997 crisis erupted.  
More detailed discussion follows. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Huimin  Li, Bang Nam Jeon, Seong-Yeon Cho, and Thomas C. Chiang, The Impact of Sovereign Rating 
Changes and Financial Contagion on Stock Market Returns: Evidence from Five Asian Countries, 19 
GLOBAL FIN. J. 46 (2008). 
34 See History of Fin. Svcs. Comm’n, http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/ab/ab0302.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2010). 
35 See Korea Asset Mgmt. Corp., http://kamco.or.kr/eng.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010). 
36 See Korea Deposit Ins. Corp., http://www.kdic.or.kr/english/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).   
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A.   Banking reform:  Maintaining a competitive, efficient and well-regulated financial system 
to be protected from international contagion 
 
Significant restructuring took place immediately after the crisis in both the banking and 
non-banking sectors in Korea.  Restructuring of the financial system took off in June 1998 as the 
FSC ordered 5 of 20 major commercial banks to be closed.37  Seven other banks were allowed to 
continue their operations under specific conditions imposed and were given time to improve their 
capital structure.  The largest two of the seven banks, Citizens Commercial Bank and Hanil Bank, 
were directed to be merged as Hanvit Bank, and merger partners were found for other three 
banks.38  The Korea Exchange Bank was able to improve its capital structure by obtaining foreign 
capital from Germany, and the Kukmin Bank sold a large block of stocks to Goldman Sachs.39  
Two major commercial banks, Cheil Bank (or Korea First Bank when translated) and Seoul Bank 
were nationalized through downsizing the capital structure and recapitalization by the 
government.40  A controlling share of Cheil Bank was taken by Newbridge Capital in 1999, an 
investment group in the U.S.,41 while that of Korea Exchange Bank was obtained by Lone Star, a 
US private equity fund, in 2003.42
                                                 
37 See Dookyung Kim, Bank Restructuring in Korea 147 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Policy Papers No. 6, 
1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/plcy06e.pdf. 
  The Korean government also announced full deposit guarantees 
for all financial institutions that are covered by the KDIC.  Through the two rounds of financial 
restructuring, a total of 893 (or 42.5 percent of the total) insolvent financial institutions out of 2103 
were either closed or merged as of December 2006.  Table 2 summarizes changes in the number of 
financial institutions classified by group.  It is notable that all of the 30 merchant bank corporations, 
except one, were forced to close. 
38 Id. at 153. 
39 Id. at 152. 
40 Id. at 155.  Recapitalizations of Cheil Bank and Seoul Bank required a large capital injection of about 5 
percent of Korea’s GDP. Id. 
41 Id. at 149. 
42 See Matthias Menke & Dirk Schierek, Private Equity Investments in the Banking Industry – The Case of 
Lone Star and Korea Exchange Bank, 2 BANKS AND BANK SYSTEMS 22 (2007), available at 
http://www.businessperspectives.org/journals_free/bbs/BBS_en_2007_02_Menke.pdf (examining the 
success of Lone Star’s investment in Korea Exchange Bank). 
 17 
These drastic and decisive reform actions in the banking sector in Korea prevented runs in 
the financial sector and helped the financial sector regain competitiveness and confidence from 
foreign and domestic depositors and investors.  The downward spiral of corporate defaults and 
decreasing loans lasted only less than a year in Korea.  In 1999, overall lending by commercial 
banks to the private sector jumped 27.0 percent in real terms, after suffering a 9.7 percent drop in 
the previous year.  This short-term turn-around succeeded in driving medium-term improvement as 
well, as evidenced by improving indicators of banking/non-banking institutions’ performance.  As 
Figure 3 shows, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans in Korea’s financial 
institutions dropped from 13.5 percent in 1998 to 1.9 percent in 2006, and the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) capital ratio for commercial banks improved from 7.0 percent in 1997 to 13.1 
percent in 2006.43  This feature of the Korean recovery in the financial sector is notable when 
compared with that of other crisis-hit countries in Asia and Latin America.44
Challenges facing the banking reforms also emerged from several areas during the banking 
reform process, including the lack of transparent criteria for classifying banks into the viable and 
non-viable groups, commercial banks’ rapid switching of loan target markets from corporate loans 
to consumer loans (especially credit card loans and housing loans), and moral hazard problems by 
consumers.
 
45
                                                 
43 The BIS capital ratio is defined as a ratio of the risk-bearing capital to the risk-weighted assets, which is an 
indication of the solvency of a bank.  The BIS' Basel committee for international banking supervision has 
drawn up global standards for capital adequacy and also established criteria for the classification of loans in 
terms of risk.  Korea’s domestic banks' BIS capital ratio under Basel II went up to an average of 12.94 
percent as of March 31, 2009 from 12.31 percent at the end of 2008.  Efforts to boost capital were made 
through equity issues and by tapping the Bank Recapitalization Fund.   
  The acquisition procedures for some Korean banks became controversial in later 
44 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (May 1999) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/, for comparative studies of international financial 
contagion and the recovery process in crisis-hit countries in Asia. 
45 For more details for the banking, financial and corporate reforms in Korea and the challenges for the 
reforms from different perspectives, see Koo & Kiser, supra note 4.  See also Wonhyuk Lim and Joon-Ho 
Hahm, Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity: The Political Economy of Korea’s Financial Sector Reform, in 
FROM CRISIS TO OPPORTUNITY: FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND EAST ASIAN CAPITALISM 83 (Jongryn Mo 
& Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., 2006), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2006/01northkorea_lim/lim20060324.pdf (2006); Lee & 
Lee, supra note 10.   
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years due to a lack of transparency and sizable profits.46  Korea also faced increasing government 
debt and deficit problems.  The government deficit increased from 1.4 percent of GDP in 1997 to 
3.5 percent and 2.3 percent in 1998 and 1999, respectively.47  As a result, the central government 
debt increased from 8.8 percent of GDP in 1996 to 18.5 percent in 1999.48
 
 
B.  Establishing an Effective Non-Performing Asset Management Mechanism, such as the 
Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) 
 
 
When the Korean economy was hit by the crisis at the end of 1997, the Korean government 
responded quickly by launching financial reform programs — public funds were injected to bail 
out troubled banks and financial institutions, and banking restructuring was pursued aggressively.  
One of the key tasks was to resolve non-performing loans.  Legislation was passed in August 1997 
to establish the NPA Management Fund, and KAMCO was created in November 1997.49
KAMCO carried out its task of resolving non-performing loans (NPLs) efficiently and 
contributed to the efficient restructuring of the financial industry in Korea during the post-1997 
  At the 
same time, the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) was also expanded and recharged to 
be able to provide financial support for troubled financial institutions through recapitalizations, 
liquidity injection and loss redemption for financial institutions.  In addition, the KDIC expanded 
the depositor protection program immediately after the crisis erupted by temporarily covering all 
depositors for three years until December 2000. 
                                                 
46 Lone Star was attempting to sell its equity in Korea Exchange Bank to Kookmin Bank, but has faced 
criminal investigations from Korean regulators for stock manipulation, among other charges.   
47 See Table 1, infra. 
48 Id. 
49 See supra note 35.  KAMCO was actually expanded and converted from former so-called Seongup Kongsa 
which had been helping financial institutions to recover bad-performing loans.  It was not until December 31, 
1999 that the name was changed to KAMCO.  KAMCO is a public asset management company like the RTC 
(U.S.), Securum (Sweden), Arsenal (Finland) and Danaharta (Malaysia).  KAMCO is similar to RTC in the 
US in the sense that both try to dispose of NPL as fast as possible rather than to maximize recovery rate.  
However, KAMCO began to put more emphasis on the recovery rate by using various kinds of restructuring 
devices.  Moreover, KAMCO established its own CRC and CRV, which are joint-ventures with foreign 
investment banks such as Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter, Sonnenblick Goldman and (prior to 2008)Lehman 
Brothers. 
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crisis period.50  The role of KAMCO has been five-fold:  (1) the management and operation of the 
Non-Performing Assets Fund; (2) the acquisition and resolution of NPAs from financial 
institutions; (3) the implementation of work-out programs for distressed companies; (4) the 
management of government-owned properties and resolution of tax arrears; and (5) supporting the 
recovery of consumer credit.  One of the major functions of KAMCO was to acquire and dispose of 
NPLs from financially distressed financial institutions and companies under rehabilitation plans.51
During the post-crisis period of 1997-2006, KAMCO paid a total of 38.8 trillion won to 
purchase a total of 111 trillion won of NPLs in face value.
 
52  KAMCO applied various methods to 
dispose of the NPLs effectively and a total of 41.5 trillion won was recovered as of the end of 
2006.53  Therefore, KAMCO recovered more than the amount that was originally injected in the 
Fund, minimizing the tax payer’s burden.  This is one of the success stories in the NPL disposal 
that can be emulated by others.54
                                                 
50 See Figure 4, infra. 
  On the other hand, the KDIC raised a total of 95.5 trillion won 
and spent a total of 130 trillion won for bank recapitalization activities (63.5 trillion won), liquidity 
injection for weak financial institutions (18.5 trillion won), deposit insurance payments (30.3 
trillion won), and purchasing troubled assets (17.3 trillion won).  About two-thirds of the public 
funds were raised through bonds issues by KAMCO and KDIC.  The Korean government financed 
the deficit of the funds for financial restructuring through a special budget, foreign-borrowed funds, 
and a government-owned property management fund, among other methods.  This amounted to 
22.6 trillion won as of August 2001.  In sum, as shown in Table 3, KAMCO and KDIC’s fiscal 
support for financial restructuring during the period of November 1997-December 2006 amounted 
to 168.4 trillion won.  ($181 billion based on the won/dollar exchange rate as of Dec 2006, or 19.0 
percent of 2006 GDP, or 34.2 percent of 1997 GDP.) More than 50% of the public funds injected 
51 Supra note 49. 
52 See Table 3, infra. 
53 See KAMCO, WHITE PAPER ON NON-PERFORMING LOANS RESOLUTION FUND (2004). 
54 Current South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak has opined to this effect.  See Lee Myung-Bak, Op-Ed., 
How Korea Solved Its Banking Crisis: The World Can Learn from Our Experience in the Late ‘90s, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 27, 2009, at A11. 
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have been recovered as of December 2006, as shown in Figure 5, through the efficient 
implementation of maintinance, sales and transfer of public funds projects. 
There are a few noteworthy points here.  First, although Korea had no experience and/or 
expertise in handling such a massive amount of NPLs, the task was done swiftly and successfully.  
Second, when KAMCO disposed of a massive volume of NPLs purchased at a discount, it used 
various innovative ways to obtain the highest possible returns — public auctions, direct sales, 
international tenders, adopting Corporate Restructuring Vehicles (CRVs) or Corporate 
Restructuring Companies (CRCs),55
KAMCO’s various NPL disposal approaches had other positive effects. Financial 
intermediaries such as CRV’s were adopted in Korea for the first time.  The merger and acquisition 
market was stimulated, and corporate restructuring methods became more sophisticated.  Korea’s 
experience in NPL resolutions with KAMCO became a role model to other countries in Asia and 
 issuing asset-backed securities (ABS), and debt-equity swaps.  
Third, the NPL problem of financial institutions in Korea was addressed quickly and decisively.  
Only 2 days after the KAMP was established, it purchased a total of 4.4 trillion won worth of NPLs 
from Cheil Bank (or Korea First Bank) and Seoul Bank at 2.9 trillion won.  KAMCO purchased a 
total face value of 99.5 trillion of NPLs until August 2001 and paid 38.2 trillion won.  Fourth, the 
bail-out measures should have built-in exit measures with clear time frames.  A plan for handing 
over government-owned nationalized banks to the private sector at the earliest convenience is a 
must.  Fifth, although the bail-out plans were executed promptly and decisively, the plans were 
flexible and adaptable.  KAMCO and KDIC also injected needed short-term liquidity to merchant 
banks and other financial institutions by using repurchasing agreements of lower-preferred bonds 
issued by troubled banks and by providing direct loans to them.   
                                                 
55 The corporate restructuring company (CRC) is a Korean version of a vulture fund, specializing in the 
restructuring of distressed companies, and the Corporate Restructuring Vehicle (CRV) is a vehicle especially 
for restructuring workout companies.  The CRC is based on The Industrial Development Act (May 1999), 
while The Act on Corporate Restructuring Vehicles (May 1999) defined CRV as a paper company in the 
form of mutual fund which pools distressed assets of financial institutions and transfers them to asset 
management company for specialized management. 
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Eastern Europe.  Recently the Korean government has allowed KAMCO to invest in overseas MPC 
markets. 
It is worthwhile to examine how KAMCO dealt with assets and liabilities for troubled 
banks.  When it purchased NPLs from troubled banks it paid a fair price with a reasonable discount.  
For example, KAMCO paid 38.2 trillion won from its inception in November 1997 to August 2001 
to purchase assets with a collective face value of 99.5 trillion won.  The discount rate is, on average, 
65 percent.  The asset-liability purchase procedures for exiting banks were different.  To minimize 
the adverse impact of a bank’s bankruptcy procedure on the market value of the processed bank 
and its customers, KAMCO used the so-called Purchase and Assumption (P&A) method under 
which bankruptcy procedures would be followed only after transferring the assets and liabilities of 
the processed bank to acquiring banks.  The acquiring banks assumed only good assets while 
KAMCO acquired the remaining bad assets at a significant discount.  For the smooth transfer of 
assets and liabilities of exit banks, the Korean government, in cooperation with the FSC, 
established special-purpose bridge banks, such as Hanahreum Merchant Bank and Hanahreun Fund, 
and new banks such as Hanaro Merchant Bank.   
KAMCO assessed the risk level of NPLs and classified them into three levels — normal 
loans, special loans and workout loans.  Special loans were the loans to firms undergoing the 
bankruptcy procedure with courts, workout loans were the loans to firms subject to workout 
agreements with the bank, and the rest were considered normal loans.  Each loan was also 
classified as either collateralized or uncollateralized.  The purchasing price of a normal loan by 
KAMCO was the market price of the underlying collateral, i.e., the effective collateral value 
multiplied by the average bidding acceptance rate.  The effective rate was the assessed price of the 
collateral minus liens, and the average bidding acceptance rate was the court bid price of the same 
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kind/market assessed price.  Non-collateral normal loans were purchased at 3 percent of the face 
value of the loan, which was increased to 9 percent in 1999.56
 
 
C.  Corporate Sector Reform:  Chaebol Reform and Corporate Governance 
 
The Korean crisis in 1997-98 showed that the highly leveraged and vulnerable corporate 
sector was one of the key contributing factors to outbreak and depth of the banking crisis, caused 
by accumulated NPLs and over-borrowing from foreign sources.  A liquidity crunch and the 
deepened recession during the post-crisis period hurt the corporate sector even more.  This 
downward spiral of events needed to be broken.  In particular, chaebols, which are characterized by 
closed ownership within the family of the founder and a highly diversified business structure, 
became the core target of corporate sector reform.   
In January 1998, the Korean government and major chaebols agreed to reform the business 
practices of the chaebols.57  Since then many drastic changes in business practices have been 
implemented, such as the improvement of transparency in accounting and finance, the increase in 
minority shareholders rights, and the reform of the composition of boards of directors, among 
others.  The Korean government and congress have introduced various laws and regulations to 
induce private firms and chaebols to improve their corporate governance and capital structures and 
focus on core competencies.58
                                                 
56 For the detailed information on purchasing prices and procedures of non-performing loans (NPLs), see 
KAMCO, supra note 53, at chapter 3.    
 
57 In early January 1998, President-elect Kim Dae-jung and the major Korean chaebols agreed to the five-
points of the accord, which became the main targets of President Kim s chaebol policies:  1) to hold chaebol 
leaders more accountable for managerial performance; 2) to boost managerial transparency; 3) to improve 
financial health; 4) to focus on core businesses; and 5) to eliminate loan guarantees among affiliates.  A later 
presidential announcement in August 1999, added three supplementary items to the chaebol reform agenda:  
1) prohibiting the domination of finance by industrial capital; 2) suppressing circular investment and unfair 
transactions among chaebol affiliates; 3) preventing improper bequests or gifts to chaebol heirs.  These 
“5+3” principles were aimed at implementing fundamental reforms in the chaebol structure during the post-
crisis period.  For details, see FEDERATION OF KOREAN INDUSTRIES, IMPLEMENTATION STATUS AND FUTURE 
SUBJECTS OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING (CEO Report Vol. 651, 2002) (in Korean). 
58 For more details on the chaebol reform in Korea, see ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURING IN KOREA: REFORMING THE CHAEBOL (Stephan Haggard, Wonhyuk Lim & Euysung Kim, 
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First, there have been significant efforts to enhance transparency in corporate finance, 
accounting and ownership structures.  Beginning in 1999, chaebols were required to provide a 
consolidated financial statement free from intragroup interlocking transactions.  Korea’s 
accounting standards were revised to be consistent with international accounting standards, 
including the requirement of an independent audit committee in all listed companies.  In April 1998, 
the government banned affiliated chaebol firms from providing debt/payment guarantees to other 
affiliated chaebol firms, or cross-debt or payment guarantees. 
 Second, various new rules of corporate governance were established to reduce 
conglomerate structures — concentrated and interlocking ownership in a family or internal 
group —  to protect minority shareholders rights and to increase the transparency of the board of 
directors structure by requiring all listed companies to appoint one or more outside director.  Banks 
also have many outside directors.  These features are all typical characteristics of the Anglo-
American system of corporate governance.  Third, in 1998 the government further freed mergers 
and acquisition (M&A) activity and further opened domestic stock and financial markets to foreign 
investors.  Foreign investors were able to greatly increase their market shares and ownership of 
Korean firms.59
Fifth, the Korean government introduced or revised bankruptcy-related laws, simplifying 
legal processes for bankruptcy filings and corporate rehabilitations.
  Fourth, the capital structure of large firms in Korea has improved and profitability 
has also increased during the post-crisis period.  The top five chaebols were able to reduce their 
debt-equity ratios below the 200 percent level by the end of 1999 using recapitalization, sales of 
risky assets and the inducement of foreign capital investment.   
60
                                                                                                                                                    
eds., 2003); see also Myung-hyun Kang, Chaebol Reform and Corporate Governance, 3 KOREA ECON. 
RESEARCH (1999) (in Korean). 
  For financially troubled but 
59 For some of Korea’s representative firms, foreign stockholders hold or have held controlling stakes — 
such as POSCO (66.7%, as of December 31, 2003), Samsung Electronics (57.3%), Hyundai Motors (51.3%), 
SK Telecom (47.0%), and Shinsegae (48.9%). 
60 The bankruptcy law and workout laws were introduced earlier in 1962, and they were revised and used 
heavily after the 1997 crisis in Korea. See Yongjae Lim, The Corporate Bankruptcy System and the 
Economic Crisis, in, HAGGARD ET AL., supra note 58, at 207. The number of corporations filing for corporate 
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viable firms, the government encouraged lending banks and creditors to support restructuring 
efforts, instead of filing for bankruptcy and entering the liquidation process.61
Finally, a drastic, but controversial, government-directed corporate restructuring effort was 
made by the Korean government to streamline the core competence of big chaebols in 1999-2000.  
To reduce excess capacity and overlapping investment, the government proposed a series of 
business swaps and consolidations in various industries — such as the semiconductor, 
petrochemical, aerospace, railway vehicle, power-generator/ship-engine, oil refining, electronics, 
and automobile industries.  The initiative was called “business swap” or “big deal.”
  The restructuring 
tasks are called the “work-out” process, which include debt rescheduling, write-off or write-down 
of debt, providing new loans, assistance of management by experts, and streamlining core business 
operations and the workforce, among others. 
62
As a result, Korean firms become stronger and less vulnerable to crisis-type shocks coming 
from domestic and foreign markets.  The debt-equity ratio of chaebols dropped from more than 500 
percent during the pre-crisis period to less than 200 percent during the post-crisis period.  Korean 
firms also experienced increased transparency, efficiency and profitability.
  Some of the 
largest chaebols, including Daewoo, were allowed to fail.  The government revised “The Industry 
Development Law” in January 1999 to allow Corporate Restructuring Companies (CRCs) to 
provide services for planning and implementing restructuring projects with investors, and 
introduced the Corporate Restructuring Vehicles (CRV) Act to streamline the management of 
workout on behalf of creditor financial institutions.   
63
                                                                                                                                                    
workout was only 22 before 1996, but jumped to 322 and 728 in 1997 and 1998, respectively. See KAMCO, 
supra note 53. 
 
61 To facilitate corporate restructuring, the government launched a corporate restructuring fund of 1.6 trillion 
won in October 1998.  Domestic banks also reached an agreement on June 25, 1998, called “The Financial 
Institution Agreement for the Enhancement of the Corporate Restructuring.” 
62 For the background and processes of the big deals in detail, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., 
REGULATORY REFORM IN KOREA: THE ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN REGULATORY REFORM (2000), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/38/32481170.pdf. 
63 For an empirical analysis of the impact of corporate reforms on efficiency and profitability of Korean firms, 
see Kineung Choo et al., Performance Changes of the Business Groups Over Two decades: Technological 
 25 
 
V.  A Still Vulnerable Korea Addresses the 2008-09 Crisis 
 A decade later, the Korean economy is facing another crisis.  The current crisis has spilled 
over from the U.S.  subprime mortgage crisis, rather than from the Southeast Asian currency and 
banking crises which started in 1997.  Korea’s real GDP growth rate dropped to 2.2 percent in 2008 
from higher than 5 percent level during the previous two years;64 investments in facilities and 
construction have been shrunk; and real wage rates have declined.65 In the external side of the 
Korean economy, the current account turned from positive to negative in 2008; the capital account 
reached a record level of deficits amounting to $51 billion in 2008 caused by massive foreign 
capital outflows from stock and bond investments; and international reserves dropped from $262 
billion in 2007 to $201 billion at the end of 2008.  The Korean banks suffered from an acute 
foreign currency liquidity crunch in 2008 as the Korean won depreciated more than 25 per cent 
against the dollar during the same year.  Their troubles have prompted the Korean government to 
take action by announcing a $130 billion bailout fund (about 14 percent of GDP) in October 
2008,66 while the Bank of Korea has been cutting the interest rate and buying their bonds since 
early 2008.67
                                                                                                                                                    
Capabilities and Investment Inefficiency in Korean Chaebols, 57 ECON. DEV. AND CULTURAL CHANGE 359 
(2009). 
 
64 See Table 1, infra. In 2008, Korea’s third and fourth quarter GDP growth rates (0.2 percent and -5.1 
percent, respectively) were lower than the previous two quarters (5.8 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively).  
In 2009, the Korean economy showed a sign of turn-around with 0.1 percent, 2.6 percent, and 2.9 percent of 
real GDP growth rates for the first three quarters, respectively.  The International Monetary Fund increased 
its projection of Korea’s growth from 1.5 percent to 3.6 percent on October 30, 2009. 
65 Korean household and banking sectors have proven to be relatively less vulnerable to a decline in housing 
prices since 2007.  The main reasons include that during 2005-2007, the Korean government controlled 
housing prices by imposing price ceilings on new apartments and reducing the price of publicly built housing, 
raised taxes on capital gains, and limited bank lending for mortgages.  As of 2008, mortgages account for 40 
percent of household liabilities in Korea, compared with the U.S. share of around 75 percent.  See Myung-
koo Kang, Global Financial Crisis and Systematic Risks in the Korean Banking Sector (Korea Economic 
Institute Academic Paper Series, Vol.  4, No. 35, 2009). 
66 This rescue package includes debt guarantees.  In addition, Korea’s Financial Services Commission (FSC) 
announced the creation of a 40 trillion won ($36.3 billion) Finance Stability Fund as a contingency plan and a 
backup measure to the bank capitalization fund of the 20 trillion won ($18.1 billion) fund. 
67 The Bank of Korea (BOK) dropped the BOK base rate gradually from 5 percent in early 2008 to 2 percent 
in February 2009.  The BOK changed its monetary policy target interest rate from overnight call rates to 
BOK base rates in March 2008. 
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The current crisis is different from the previous one in its origin, contagion channel, nature 
and scope.  The Korean economy, however, is believed to be better prepared for this crisis.  Korea 
has accumulated large international reserves, after a brief period of setback, reaching $254 billion 
as of September 2009, which is sufficient to pay out all short-term external debt (about $152 
billion), compared to $30 billion (only $9 billion of the readily available portion) in 1997.  Banks 
and non-bank financial institutions are now better capitalized with the BIS capital ratio over 13 
percent, compared with lower than 7 percent in 1997.  Korean firms have a sounder balance sheet 
structure with debt-equity ratio of lower than 200 percent, compared with more than 400 percent in 
1997.  Corporate finance is more transparent, corporate governance has improved vastly, and the 
legal system for corporate restructuring and workout is in better shape, thanks to the extensive 
reform efforts during the post-crisis period.  However, the Korean economy has shown signs of 
vulnerability in a few areas – some are new and some are recurring.  
 First, the Korean economy is more exposed to foreign shocks now than a decade ago due to 
the implementation of liberalization measures during the post-crisis period.  Foreign investors play 
a more important role in setting prices and leading market trends in the financial markets, and 
foreign firms have increased their shares of ownership.68
 Second, Korea’s external sector has become weaker in recent years.  The current account 
has reversed its position from surplus to deficits, and capital and financial accounts have turned to 
the negative position.  Korea’s net portfolio investment balance shifted from surplus (net inflow) to 
deficit (net outflow) since 2006, more conspicuously during the current global financial crisis 
  The spillover effects of foreign shocks to 
the domestic economy and businesses have increased significantly through this new channel of 
contagion.  The Korean government needs to establish an efficient surveillance and monitoring 
system for foreign capital, especially volatile forms such as speculative and highly leveraged 
portfolio investment activities by foreign investors. 
                                                 
68 See Figure 6, infra. 
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period.69  Consequentially, Korea’s external debt has increased significantly, reaching more than 
$380 billion, which is about 40 percent of Korea’s GDP.  Furthermore, the maturity structure of the 
external debt has worsened; as the ratio of short-term debt in total external debt has increased 
beyond the 40 percent level, which is approaching the 1997-98 level.70  In the capital account, by 
composition, large deficits in foreign direct investment and portfolio investment positions have 
been compensated by large amounts of borrowing by banks.  Branches of foreign banks in Korea 
have been observed to borrow a significant portion of total bank borrowing.  This is reminiscent of 
over-borrowing by merchant banks during the pre-1997 crisis period, which was one of the 
important contributing factors for the 1997 crisis.  The impact of the increased foreign bank 
penetration in emerging economies has been debated in the banking literature.71 To maximize the 
positive role and minimize the negative role of foreign banks, effective banking regulations and a 
surveillance system for foreign banks are called for.72
  Third, although the amount of international reserves has increased significantly, its 
maturity structure and asset/currency composition have not been managed efficiently.  The 
increasing volatility of the Korean won with respect to the U.S. dollar and Japanese won have put 
significant burdens on the exports of Korean firms and their profitability.  To defend the value of 
the Korean won in the foreign exchange market, the Bank of Korea has had to use the significant 
portions of its international reserves in recent months, which has created large volatility in the 
balance of international reserve assets.  It will become important more than before to maintain a 
  
                                                 
69 See Figure 7, infra. 
70 See Figure 8, infra. 
71 For the implication of increased foreign bank penetration on monetary policy transmission mechanism 
in emerging economies, see Ji Wu, Alina Luca & Bang Nam Jeon, Foreign Bank Penetration and the 
Lending Channel in Emerging Economies: Evidence from Bank-level Panel Data (forthcoming 2010). 
72 The Korean government has applied strict regulations on liquidity, risk management and internal 
management to domestic financial institutions participating in foreign exchange markets.  (e.g., THE 
REGULATION ON SUPERVISION OF BANKING BUSINESS, enacted in April 1998 and amended in May 2007) 
However, as of May 2009, there are no specific rules or regulations that can properly monitor and supervise 
the real-time, short-term capital flows by domestic branches of foreign banks in Korea.  See Kang (2009), 
ibid., p.  11. 
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stable level of international reserves and seek an optimal composition of international reserve 
assets by asset type and currency denomination.      
 Fourth, several new domestic agenda have emerged in the Korean economy while coping 
with the 2008-9 global economic crises.  The new agenda include a need for further labor market 
reform, shift of the bank loan market from commerce loans to consumer loans, a credit card bubble, 
increasing household debt, speculation in the housing sector, and lackluster investments in the 
corporate sector.73  The government debt also increased to 35.6 percent of GDP due to the 
increased government deficit.74
 
  Since the Korean economy has become more dynamic and 
interlinked among its sub-sectors, vulnerability built up in any sector of the economy could trigger 
bubble-bursting and/or self-fulfilling down spiral phenomena, which could lead to a crisis.   
VI.  Enhancing Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia75
In retrospect, there have been various sources of dissatisfaction within the region in dealing 
with the 1997-98 crisis, which played a role in enhancing cooperation on economic and financial 
agenda among Asian countries during the post-crisis period.  Those main sources of dissatisfaction 
include:  (1) unprepared financial liberalization which led to an excessive influx of short-term 
foreign capital and a lack of risk hedging vehicles, (2) volatile currency trading and speculative 
activities by Western investors and difficulty in establishing an appropriate exchange rate regime in 
light of such volatility and significant exchange rate misalignments, (3) inappropriate, excessive, 
and uniform one-size-fits-all prescriptions imposed by the IMF as so-called IMF conditionality, 
 
                                                 
73 For new challenges for the Korean economy facing the 2008-09 global financial crisis, see Pyo Hak-kil, 
Global Financial Crisis and the Korean Economy: Issues and Perspectives, 25 KOREA’S ECONOMY 8 (2009), 
available at http://www.keia.org/Publications/KoreasEconomy/2009/PYO.pdf. 
74 The projected government deficit in 2009 is 51 trillion won, which is 5.0 percent of GDP.  This is still 
lower than the U.S.  (13.6%), Japan (9.9%), and U.K.  (9.8%).  The expected accumulated government debt 
in the end of 2009 is 366 trillion won (35.6% of GDP).  Korea’s government debt ratio to GDP is still much 
lower than Japan (217%), Italy (115%), and the United States (87%). 
75 Part of this section is from an updated version of Bang Nam Jeon, Progress and Prospects of Regional 
Financial Arrangements and Cooperation:  A Critical Survey, presented at the International Finance Seminar, 
ADBI/ADB, Penang, Malaysia (July 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305688. 
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ignoring country-specific elements of the root-causes of the crisis, the crisis situation, and crisis 
management, and (4) the lack of sufficient and prompt liquidity support from inside and outside the 
region in the early stages of the crisis and the lack of self-help mechanisms within the region. 
A collective and regional approach is believed to serve better than an individualistic 
approach to manage crises.  Some academics have argued that if East Asian nations had shown 
more solidarity in responding to the initial crisis in 1997, especially in defending the values of 
Asian currencies from the attack of speculative hedge funds, the severity of the crisis might have 
been reduced.  Having suffered from the havoc of the economic crises of 1997, many countries in 
East Asia started to realize the urgent need for regional financial and monetary cooperation (also 
known as RFC/RMC) in order to prevent the reoccurrence of a similar crisis in the region in the 
future.  The East Asian economies seem to be more prepared for the RFC/RMC initiatives by 
experiencing more intra-regional trade and investment in recent years and accumulating a 
significant amount of international reserve assets held by monetary authorities in East Asia.76
In September 1997, Japan proposed an “Asian Monetary Fund” (AMF) to prevent the 
reoccurrence of another Asian financial crisis and to institutionalize financial cooperation among 
the countries in the region.  Strong objections from the U.S.  and the IMF, among other reasons, 
almost killed the idea of the AMF, leading to no further tangible progress toward establishing a 
regional monetary institution in East Asia — although there has been heated debate on how to 
  A 
regional framework has been taking shape as a consequence of the AMF proposal, the Manila 
Framework and the Chiang Mai Initiative.  Here are brief accounts of each of the three initiatives.   
                                                 
76 As of September 2009, China holds the world largest value of international reserves ($2,273 billion), 
followed by Japan ($1,052 billion), Russia ($413 billion), Saudi Arabia ($395 billion), Taiwan ($332 billion), 
India ($280 billion), and Korea ($254 billion).  The four East Asian nations hold more than 45 percent of 
world total international reserve assets.  See Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency 
Liquidity, Int’l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/colist.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). 
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prevent and manage further crises in the region.  The main argument was that it would overlap with 
the IMF and lead to an increased moral hazard problem.77
In November 1997, a new framework for an improved RFC, called the “Manila 
Framework” was announced in a meeting of finance ministers and central bankers from 14 Asia-
Pacific countries in Manila to discuss further responses to the Asian financial crisis.
 
78  The Manila 
Framework included the following four initiatives:  (1) regional surveillance of macroeconomic 
policies, foreign exchange policies, and relevant financial systems in member nations, (2) 
providing technical assistance for strengthening the financial sector in the region, (3) pushing for 
the restructuring of the IMF to cope with financial crises, including the enhancement of the 
effectiveness of the New Arrangement to Borrow and reconsidering the access limit within the IMF 
financial program for the provision of short-term loans to troubled economies, and (4) establishing 
cooperative financing support arrangements to stabilize Asian currencies and serve as a 
complementary financing source for IMF-supported programs to the Asian countries and for 
incremental international reserves of an economy in need of emergency liquidity support. 79
The search for regional financial arrangements gained momentum in May 2000, when the 
ASEAN + 3 finance ministers agreed to expand the existing network of swap arrangements by 
including all ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and Korea, designed to better withstand future 
  The 
Manila Framework was reinforced by the New Miyazawa Initiative, which prepared funds 
amounting to ￥3 trillion (approximately US$30 billion) to be used for short-term liquidity support 
and long-term bilateral assistance to troubled member nations.   
                                                 
77 For more detail, see ASIAN DEV. BANK, STUDY ON MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COOPERATION IN EAST 
ASIA (SUMMARY REPORT) (May 2002), available at http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou/kokkin/tyousa/tyou056.pdf.   
78 The 14 member nations of the Manila Framework are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, China, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the U.S. 
79 See THE CHAIRMAN’S SUMMARY OF THE 8TH FINANCE AND CENTRAL BANK DEPUTIES MEETING OF THE 
MANILA FRAMEWORK GROUP (2001), available at  http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/if037.htm.   
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financial crises by helping central banks of other countries in the region. 80  The government-to-
government currency swap deal provides that one country may borrow funds from the other 
country in the contract which has the effect of building up a country’s foreign exchange reserves.81
This plan, called the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), is considered to be as a major step 
toward strengthening financial cooperation among the East Asian countries.  The rationale of the 
CMI was to strengthen the self-help and support mechanisms in East Asia by establishing a 
regional financing arrangement to supplement existing international facilities.  Subsequently, the 
ASEAN nations agreed, at the ASEAN+3 summit conference held in Singapore in November 2000, 
to expand the size of the multilateral currency swap facility from $200 million to $1 billion.  Three 
bilateral currency swap agreements, between Korea and Japan ($7 billion, Korean won and 
Japanese yen based), Malaysia and Japan, and Thailand and Japan, for a total of $6 billion, were 
also signed in May 2001.  In November 2001, Korea reached an agreement with China and 
Thailand to swap $2 billion and $1 billion, respectively, in case of an emergency.  The 2007 
ASEAN finance ministers meeting in Chiang Mai again agreed to explore an infrastructure 
financing mechanism for ASEAN.  No concrete agreement has been reached yet, but now seems to 
be a good time to seriously explore this at the East Asia level.
  
82
 The ultimate objective for establishing an RFA/RFC in East Asia should be to prevent the 
recurrence of an economic crisis in the region, which is being prepared for collectively.  A specific 
  To address the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis, the Korean government made $30 billion worth of currency swaps with the Federal 
Reserve of the United States in October 2008.  It has also expanded the currency swap amounts 
with Japan ($20 billion) and China (worth about $26 billion, in local currency).   
                                                 
80 See The Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting, May 6, 2000, Chiang  
Mai, Thailand, available at http://www.aseansec.org/635.htm (outlining a plan for increased cooperation 
across the region aimed at dealing with regional financial issues). 
81 Id. 
82 See Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Op-Ed., East Asian Financial Cooperation Key to Crisis, ASAHI.COM (May 
26, 2009) (original no longer available), available at 
http://www.tdri.or.th/en/pdf/chalongphob_sussangkarn_east.pdf (arguing for a regional solution to financial 
crisis management). 
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agenda for reform will include establishing an early warning system, strengthening regional 
surveillance, establishing new, quick financing facilities as a complement to the IMF facility, 
strengthening financial market supervision and regulation, and reshaping the G-8/G-20 led 
international financial architecture reform efforts by including capital controls and regulations of 
speculative hedge funds.   
So far, the several ideas and proposals for establishing RFC/RMC have faced challenges or 
objections.  The U.S. and European countries, along with the IMF, did not support the Japanese 
attempt to establish the AMF which will pool together the resources from Asian countries and play 
as a regional lender-of-last-resort (LLR).  The main objections were the AMF’s functional overlap 
with existing institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, and the possibility of a serious moral 
hazard problem caused by the so-called “soft conditionality”, and the lack of discipline among peer 
group nations in Asia.  Just ten years later, these accusations proved to be inaccurate. 
The advocates of the AMF stress that Asia needs a regional LLR because global 
emergency resources for East Asia, including the IMF and the World Bank, are insufficient, 
considering the size of the East Asian economies in the face of volatile capital flows in and out of 
the region.  Other advantages which would be presented by an Asian LLR include:  augmented 
sources of short-term liquidity to member nations in need of short-term assistance; reduced 
probability of financial contagion in the region, which has seen increasingly linked regional 
economies; the maintenance of exchange rate stability with less volatility; more accurate 
familiarity with member countries’ socioeconomic, political, and cultural background; and more 
reliable and updated peer reviews by insiders rather than by outsiders.   
As an alternative to the AMF, a weaker form of RFC would be pooling international 
reserve assets and sharing them among member nations in the region.  An example of the weak 
form of resource pooling would be similar to the bilateral/ multilateral currency swap agreements 
under the Chiang Mai Initiative.  Another form would be a common decentralized reserve pooling 
mechanism, in which each member nation contributes a specified share of its international reserve 
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assets to a common pool.  Each country would then be eligible to draw on the pool for an amount 
up to a predetermined multiple of the amount deposited.  A participating nation in the resource 
pooling would then be able economize on their own reserve accumulation by gaining access to the 
total regional pool of liquid funds, and, as a member of the group, each country would gain some 
influence over the policies of other members.   
 There are several obstacles to overcome for successful regional financial cooperation 
among the East Asian nations.  These include the diversity and heterogeneity of the countries’ 
economic characteristics, the wide spectrum of economic development and lack of economic 
convergence in the region, and the lack of political will and commitment to regional cooperation 
and integration.  Another important but practical question is who will and is able to lead 
harmonious efforts toward establishing an effective and solid RFA/RFC in the region – Japan, 
China, or a collective form led by participants inside and/or outside East Asia. 
Based on this discussion, we may derive some practical strategies for establishing an effective 
RFC scheme in the East Asian region in order to prevent the recurrence of a financial/economic 
crisis and large-scale contagion in the region.  First, enhance the “political will” behind the 
implementation and commitment to the development of a self-help support mechanism beyond the 
CMI framework in the East Asian region.  Second, create an environment of support from the IMF, 
ASEM (The Asia and Europe Meeting) and G-8/G-20 nations by pushing a regional RFC scheme, 
such as the CMI, to be structured to complement, not oppose, the IMF and other international 
institutions and eliminating moral hazard concerns by establishing a set of clear operational 
guidance and principles in extending financial facilities to member nations.  Third, convince 
Westerners that a regional fund could monitor and respond to crises in the region more 
appropriately and swiftly than a worldwide one, and that the East Asian countries have the 
commitment, ability and know-how to establish and run an independent but supplemental RFC in 
East Asia by developing an effective regional surveillance system.  Fourth, present a clear vision 
based on a gradual and progressive approach to expanding the CMI of the ASEAN+3 toward the 
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AMF, or some like organization, as an Asian LLR, and the eventual establishing of the Asian 
Monetary Union (AMU) in the future.  Finally, seek stable and productive sources of foreign 
capital with long-term maturity, including FDI and bond-market financing, by providing a 
favorable and sound environment for foreign investors.83  A long-term strategy and vision will also 
lead the East Asian nations to an intensive form of regional monetary integration, which may create 
an Asian monetary union and a single Asian currency in the future.84
 
  Korea may find a unique role 
in enhancing regional financial and monetary cooperation relations among the East Asian countries.   
 
VII.  Concluding Remarks 
 
 A recent study by Reinhart and Rogoff on the history of financial crises, covering eight 
centuries of data from England’s fourteenth-century default to the 2008-09 U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis, found that financial or economic crises are a universal phenomenon and frequently 
recurring common events.85
This paper focused on the Korean crises, which experienced the worst damage as well as 
the most successful recovery from the 1997 crisis, and discussed the success and failure of post-
crisis reform efforts while identifying vulnerable areas which need further reform.  I also discussed 
  East Asian countries were hit hard by the 1997-98 financial crisis.  A 
decade later, they have been suffering again from the current global financial/economic crises.  
Since financial crises are common and repeating phenomena, we may not be able to completely 
avoid another round of crises in the years to come.  This is a great challenge facing the global 
economy, and the prevention of the recurrence of future crises is urgently called for.   
                                                 
83 See Bang Nam Jeon & Se-Young Ahn, Changing Receptivity Towards TNCs in the Republic of Korea: 
Survey Results and Policy Implications, 10 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 119 (2001), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit27v10n1_en.pdf (reporting on the various ways to make Korea a more 
attractive environment for foreign direct investment). 
84 For a feasibility study on monetary union in East Asia, see Bang Nam Jeon and Hongfang Zhang, A 
Currency Union or an Exchange Rate Union: Evidence from Northeast Asia, 22 J. OF ECON. INTEGRATION 
256 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1305660. 
85 See Carmen. M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight 
Centuries of Financial Crises (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 13882, 2008), available 
at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/files/faculty/51_This_Time_Is_Different.pdf. 
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specific lessons to be learned from Korea’s experience during the 1997-98 crisis in order to help 
prevent the outbreak of similar financial crises in the future.   
These specific lessons are, first, to monitor international capital flows carefully and to 
implement efficient international debt management policies to avoid currency- and maturity-
mismatch; second, to maintain competitive, efficient and well-regulated banking and financial 
systems that are protected from international contagion; third, to establish effective resolution 
mechanisms for non-performing assets and loans, such as the Korea Asset Management 
Corporation (KAMCO); and fourth, to enhance regional financial cooperation among the East 
Asian countries, such as a renewed Chiang Mai Initiative to provide short-term liquidity support 
when crises hit the region, or, alternatively, setting up an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) as a lender 
of last resort in the Asian region.  Although past financial crises may share many commonalities, 
each crisis has been shown to have idiosyncratic features.  There are no one-size-fits-all 
prescriptions for crisis management policies.  The Korean case has provided a good example for 
this golden rule.  IMF conditionality, which did not take into account the unique nature of financial, 
corporate and social systems in Korea, inflicted unjustifiable harm to the most vulnerable groups of 
people and businesses in Korea during the post-crisis reform period.   
As evidenced in recent experiences of Korea’s responses to the current financial crisis, 
Korea needs to establish an efficient management mechanism for the capital account, especially 
short-term portfolio investment flows, and international reserve assets.  Proper surveillance and 
regulation of foreign banks in Korea are called for.  The Korean word for “crisis”’ is “ui gi,” 
combining the words for “danger” and “opportunity.”  When we learn lessons from our past 
experiences and mistakes, we will be able to convert a crisis of danger into the blessing of 
opportunity. 
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1.  Macroeconomic indicators of Korea, 1994-200886
 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
I.  Domestic sector:  Macro fundamentals 
Real GDP growth rate, % 7.9 8.6 6.4 4.8 -5.7 8.7 8.1 4.0 6.7 3.1 4.6 4.0 5.2 5.1 2.2 
Gross fixed investment 
growth rate, % 12.5 13.1 8.4 -2.3 -22.9 8.3 12.2 -0.2 6.6 4.0 2.1 2.4 3.6 4.0 -1.7 
Inflation rate (CPI, %) 6.3 4.5 4.9 4.4 7.5 0.8 2.3 4.1 2.8 3.5 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.5 4.7 
Unemployment rate, % 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.6 7.0 6.3 4.1 3.8 3.1 1.7 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.2 
Governemnt budget 
surplus/deficit, % of GDP 0.4 0.3 0.2 -1.4 -3.5 -2.3 1.0 1.1 3.1 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 3.2 1.3 
Government debt (tril.  
Won), [% of GDP]    
60.3 
[12.3] 
80.4 
[16.6] 
93.6 
[18.6] 
111.4 
[18.5] 
122.1 
[18.7] 
133.6 
[18.5] 
165.7 
[21.5] 
203.1 
[24.6] 
248.0 
[28.7] 
282.8 
[31.1] 
298.9 
[30.7] 
308.3 
[30.1] 
Interest rate, % 
(call rate), year end 14.1 11.1 12.5 21.3 7.0 4.8 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.3 4.2 4.8 3.3 
Stock price index, KOSPI 
1980.1.4 = 100 965 935 833 655 406 807 734 573 757 680 833 1074 1352 1713 1533 
 
II.  External sector:   Trade, capital flows, int’l reserves, external debt, exchange rates 
Exports, $bil. 95 125 130 139 132 145 176 152 163 197 258 289 332 379 433 
Imports, $bil. 98 129 145 142 91 117 159 138 149 175 220 256 304 350 427 
Current a/c balance, $bil.  
(% of GDP) 
-4.0 
(-1.0) 
-8.7 
(-1.7) 
-23.1 
(-4.1) 
-8.3 
(-1.6) 
40.4 
(11.7) 
24.5 
(5.5) 
12.3 
(2.4) 
8.0 
(1.7) 
5.4 
(1.0) 
11.9 
(2.0) 
28.2 
(4.1) 
15.0 
(1.9) 
5.4 
(0.6) 
6.0 
(0.6) -6.4 
Capital and financial a/c 
balance ($bil.) 10.3 16.8 23.3 1.3 -3.2 2.0 12.1 -3.4 6.3 13.9 7.6 4.8 18.0 7.1 -50.9 
   a.  FDI balance ($bil.) -1.7 -1.8 -2.3 -1.6 0.7 5.1 4.3 1.1 -0.2 0.1 4.6 2.0 -4.5 -13.8 -10.6 
   b.  Portfolio investment  
balance ($bil.) 6.1 11.6 15.2 14.3 -1.2 9.2 12.2 6.7 0.3 17.3 6.6 -3.5 -23.2 -26.1 -15.4 
   c.  Borrowing by banks 
($bil.) 8 12 12 10 73 68 61 51 58 68 74 83 137 193 172 
International reserves, 
$bil. 20 25 32 32 52 74 96 102 121 155 199 210 239 262 201 
External debt, $bil 
(% of GDP), [short-
term %] 
90 
(21.2) 
[53.4] 
 
120 
(23.2) 
[57.8] 
157 
(28.2) 
[58.3] 
174 
(33.7) 
[57.6] 
164 
(47.3) 
[24.2] 
153 
(34.4) 
[28.2] 
148 
(28.9) 
[33.5] 
129 
(26.7) 
[31.3] 
142 
(25.9) 
[34.1] 
157 
(25.9) 
[32.3] 
172 
(25.3) 
[32.7] 
188 
(23.7) 
[35.1] 
260 
(29.3) 
[43.7] 
382 
(39.4) 
[41.8] 
380 
(40.9) 
[39.7] 
Exchange rate (Won/$), 
end of year 788 776 845 1695 1204 1138 1265 1314 1186 1193 1035 1012 930 936 1260 
                                                 
86 Except where otherwise noted, these tables and figures are the author’s aggregation of statistics published in THE BANK OF KOREA, MONTHLY STATISTICAL 
BULLETIN, various issues.  This data is available at http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp. 
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     Table 2.  Financial reform in Korea:  Restructuring of financial insitutions, 1997-200687
              
 
 
Types of financial 
institutions 
Total no.  of 
institutions 
(as of Dec.  1997) 
Type of resolution  
New entry 
Total no.  of 
institutions 
(as of Oct.  2006) 
License 
revoked 
Merger Others* Subtotal 
(B) 
Ratio, % 
(B/A) 
Banks 
 
33 5 11 - 16 48.5 1 18 
NBFIs** 
 
2070 164 177 536 877 42.4 109 1,302 
   Merchant banks 
(MBCs) 30 22 7 - 29 96.7 1 2 
   Securities co. 
 36 5 7 3 15 41.7 19 40 
   Insurance co. 
 50 10 6 4 20 40.0 21 51 
   Investment trust co 
(ITCs) 32 7 5 - 12 37.5 29 49 
   Mutual savings 
banks (MSBs) 231 107 28 1 136 58.9 15 110 
   Credit unions 
 1,666 2 122 527 651 39.1 15 1,030 
   Leasing companies 
 25 11 2 1 14 56.0 9 20 
 
             Total 
 
2,103 169 188 536 893 42.5 110 1,320 
 
       Notes:  * includes dissolution and asset transfers to bridge institutions.  ** Non-bank financial institutions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 PUB. FUNDS MNGMNT. COMM., MIN. OF FIN. AND ECON., WHITE PAPER ON PUBLIC FUNDS (2007). 
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          Table 3.  Sources and uses of public funds in Korea, 1997-200688
             (unit:  trillion Korean won) 
 
 
Types of financial 
institutions 
KAMCO* KDIC** and others  
Total Purchase of  
NPLs 
Recapitalization Liquidity 
injection 
Deposit insur-
ance payments 
Purchase of 
assets 
Banks 
 
24.6 34.0 13.9 0.0 14.4 86.9 
NBFIs 
 
11.8 29.5 4.6 30.3 2.9 79.1 
   Merchant banks 
 1.3 2.7 0.7 18.3 0.0 23.0 
   Insurance co 
 1.8 15.9 3.1 0.0 0.3 21.1 
   Securities co and 
inv’t trust co 8.5 10.9 0.3 0.01 1.9 21.6 
   Mutual savings 
banks 0.2 0.0 0.4 7.3 0.6 8.5 
   Credit union 
 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 4.8 
   Others 
 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 
Total 
 
38.8 63.5 18.5 30.3 17.3 168.4 
 
Notes:  * The Korea Asset Management Corporation, ** The Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 Id. 
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                            Figure 1.  Korea's real GDP growth rates (%), 1994-2008 
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        Figure 2.  The saving-investment relations and the current account balance in Korea, 1980-2008 
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                  Figure 3.  The impact of financial reform in Korea:  Remove toxic assets and 
                                                    improving BIS capital ratio 
 
 
           
 
Notes:  NPL ratio (the first bar) is the non-performing loan ratio for the entire financial industries (%), and 
BIS ratio (the second bar) is the Bank of International Settlement capital standard ratio of risk-bearing 
capital to the risk-weighted assets. 
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  Figure 4.  The KAMCO’s activity:  NPL purchases and NPL balances89
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89 KAMCO, WHITE PAPER ON NON-PERFORMING LOANS RESOLUTION FUND 423 (2004). 
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     Figure 5.  Injection and recovery of public funds in Korea, 1998-200690
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Units are:  Trillion Korean won for the Use of Public Fund and Recovery; Percent for the Recovery Rate. 
. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Joon-Kyung Kim, KDI, Public Funds and Post-Crisis Corporate and Financial Restructuring in Korea, presented at the International Forum on Non-
Performing Asset Funds, April 2007. 
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                                Figure 6.  Share of Foreign Ownership in Stock Market, Bond Market,   
                                                     and the Banking Sector in Korea*91
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Notes:  * the market share of foreign banks in Korea using the bank asset base. 
                                                 
91 Data from Joon-Kyung Kim & Chung H. Lee, The Political Economy of Government, Financial System, and the Chaebols Before and After the 1997 Financial 
Crisis in Korea (Center for Contemporary Asian Studies Working Paper No. 11, 2008), available at 
http://www1.doshisha.ac.jp/~ccas/eng/Epublications/eWP11lee.pdf; and Ji Wu et al., supra note 70. 
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                                     Figure 7.  Korea’s net portfolio investment balance, 1994-2008 
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                              Figure 8.  Korea’s external debt: Total amount ($billion) and short-term debt (% of total) 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
$b
il
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Sh
or
t-t
er
m
, %
External debt ($bil) External debt (short term, %)
 
                        
 
